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Abstract  
We study the allocation of investment projects by municipal governments across groups of 
voters using data from a fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain between 2009 and 2011. 
This program provided municipalities with a large endowment to spend in public investments 
and required the geocoding of each individual project. Combining these data with 
disaggregated election information at the census area level, we study whether politicians use 
expenditures to target their supporters or to raise turnout. Estimates from regression, matching 
and RDD methods show no evidence of local governments targeting areas of core support. 
Instead, investment goes disproportionately to low turnout areas, suggesting that politicians 
use funds to increase participation. We confirm this hypothesis by showing that, in the 
following elections, turnout is increased in areas that received more investment. Our results 
suggest that mobilization can be a force in shaping the allocation of resources across voter 
groups within cities. 
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1. Introduction
Whether politicians can effectively buy electoral support via targeted policies is a question
that has understandably received much attention both academically and in the public debate.
Voters have been shown to reward incumbents for spending, be it in the form of a specific
program targeted to individuals (like an anti-poverty cash transfer, see e.g. Manacorda, Miguel
andVigorito 2011; Pop-Eleches andPop-Eleches 2012;Baez et al. 2012), or public infrastructure
projects (such as a nation-wide road network as in Voigtlaender and Voth 2014). While this
literature convincingly shows that voters respond to spending in the polls, it is generally silent on
whether and how politicians allocate this spending across voter groups for electoral purposes.
The literature that studies alignment effects along party lines in the allocation of funds
between central and local governments could potentially be informative on this matter. There
is pervasive evidence that national level politicians favour local governments that are ruled by
their own party in the allocation of resources. However, this alignment effect could be due to
two different mechanisms. On the one hand, by favouring aligned municipalities, politicians
may be indirectly trying to target their core supporters. Alternatively, they may be using these
funds to help the local mayor secure re-election (as in the political agency model by Bracco
et al. 2015). In the absence of data at the intra-municipal level, distinguishing between spending
targeted to voters and to support the local mayor is challenging.
In this paper we use finely disaggregated data to study whether politicians allocate spending
in space in response to the spatial distribution of voters. In particular, we ask if investment
spending goes disproportionally to areas of strong support for the incumbent or if it is used
as a mobilization device to increase turnout. For this purpose, we use geo-located data on
municipal investment projects financed by Plan E, a 12 billion Euros stimulus program which
transferred funds from the Spanish central government to municipalities between 2009 and
2010. This program provides an ideal setting to study distributive politics for several reasons.
To begin with, municipal governments had substantial discretion in the use of funds with respect
to both type and location of investment projects. Given the urgency to implement this fiscal
stimulus, the national government quickly processed the applications for funding, approving in
full over 99% of them (Montolio, 2016). Virtually all municipalities applied, and the amount
they received was three times as large as their spending in infrastructures in an average year.
Finally, all Plan E investment projects were geo-located by the municipal authorities. These
characteristics of Plan E allow us to exploit within-municipal variation in spending to study
distributional politics.
To our knowledge, we are the first to study distributive politics inside cities. What enables us
to do this is the combination of finely disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and investment
projects.1 In this context, we consistently find no evidence of partisan bias in the allocation
1Our finest unit of observation is the census area. Spain has over 35,000 census areas that have no electoral
representation and are defined for merely statistical purposes. There are a total of 8,116 municipalities in Spain
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of projects within municipalities. The bias that has been identified in the alignment literature
is entirely absent within cities. In fact, political support, as measured by the vote share of
the incumbent, does not affect the geographic allocation of spending. We find that investment
goes disproportionately to areas of low turnout, suggesting that politicians use funds to increase
participation. Using data on ex-post electoral outcomes, we provide evidence of an electoral
response to local spending in terms of increased participation. Areas receiving a project see
a 0.4 percentage points increase in turnout, conditional on past turnout levels. Taken together,
these two results suggest that local investment is an effective instrument to mobilize voters.
Themost important empirical challengewe facewhen conducting our analysis arises because
the geographical distribution of voter preferences within the city is endogenous to economic,
social and cultural factors. These factors may, in turn, also affect investment decisions (Brollo
and Nannicini, 2012). This identification problem is also shared by much of the literature
studying the electoral determinants of spending across core and swing voters (as in Levitt
and Snyder, Jr. 1995 or Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006). We overcome this issue by first
relying on intra-municipal variation in the incumbents’ electoral support, and then by using as-
good-as-random variation in the identity of the incumbent party in a close election regression
discontinuity design.
Our analysis starts by asking whether local politicians target areas of strong electoral sup-
port.2 To this end, we regress measures of investment at the census-area level – e.g. a dummy
for receiving at least one project – on the vote share of the incumbent party, controlling for the
shares of all major parties and municipal fixed effects. Including all vote shares as controls
captures possible determinants of investment that are related to political preferences. Further-
more, they serve as proxies for unobserved socio-economic and cultural factors that also affect
the demand for investment. Next, we follow an alternative approach based on a close elections
regression-discontinuity design using data aggregated at the municipal level. The dependent
variable is defined as the difference between the vote share of a reference party in areas that
received an investment project and in areas that did not. We then test whether this variable
exhibits a discontinuity at the threshold value of our running variable, defined as the municipal
vote share of the reference party in the previous election. Our reference party is the centre-left
PSOE as it is the party with most mayors in our sample. A positive discontinuity would be inter-
preted as evidence that PSOE disproportionately targets areas of core support in the allocation
of projects.
Estimates from census-area level analysis are precisely estimated and all very close to zero.
In the most demanding specification, with municipal fixed effects and the full set of controls,
census areas with a 10% higher vote share of the incumbent have a 0.16 percentage points
and roughly one in four has more than one census area.
2This hypothesis is closely related to the core voters hypothesis in the political economy literature (see, e.g.
Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1995).
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higher chance to receive an investment project, with a corresponding 95% confidence interval
of [-0.75, 0.43] percentage points. Compared to the baseline probability of receiving a project
of 40%, this effect appears extremely small. Likewise, estimates obtained using RDD are
not significantly different from zero, hence our analysis provides evidence that mayors do not
use spending to favour areas of core support. This is in contrast to previous work that found
a positive association between expenditures and the share of core voters (Levitt and Snyder,
Jr., 1995; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006). Our identification strategy implicitly rests on the
assumption that investment projects have a very localized effect on voters’ utility, in the sense
that only voters in the census area that receive a project are affected. To relax this assumption,
we allow investment projects to have a less localized effect by creating “buffers” of radius 25, 50
and 100 meters around each of them. In this way, a project carried out close to a border of two
census areas is counted as having taken place in both. Alternatively, we restrict our sample by
concentrating only on those categories of projects that are most likely to have localized benefits.
Results from these two additional specifications are in line with our baseline result and show
that there is no effect of electoral support on investment decisions.
We then turn to the hypothesis that politicians target low participation areas with spending to
persuade potential voters to turn out in the polls. Using again variation at the census area level,
we find a negative association between spending and turnout. A 1% increase in the previous
election’s turnout decreases the probability of an area receiving a project by 0.14 percentage
points. Similarly, a negative correlation is found when using the number of projects received or
the fraction of investment received by the census area over the municipal total. The evidence
overall supports the hypothesis that politicians use spending to mobilize the inactive electorate
rather than benefiting their voters directly.
But what are the electoral benefits? As mentioned above, there is now a large body of
evidence that individually targeted transfers – such as conditional cash transfer programs –
are rewarded by a higher probability of turning out and supporting the incumbent. But much
less is known about the electoral effects of local investments. Recently, Voigtlaender and
Voth (2014) showed that a national highway construction plan helped raise support for the
Nazi party in Germany. Despite the fact that sub-national governments carry out two-thirds
of all public investment in developed countries (OECD, 2013), the potential electoral effects
of local spending have been understudied. To investigate this, we use data on the subsequent
municipal elections of 2011 and find that, conditional on previous electoral results, census
areas that received a Plan E investment project do not increase their support for the incumbent
party. However, we observe a response on political participation: conditional on initial levels,
areas that receive a Plan E project experience an increase in turnout. Moreover, by exploring
heterogeneous effects of receiving a project across turnout levels, we identify that this effect
comes mainly from low turnout areas. One interpretation is that localized spending changes
voters’ perception of the importance their vote can have in shaping distributive policies within
the city.
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Weconclude the empirical analysis by providing additional robustness checks that strengthen
the validity of our results. Among them, we show that the main results are not sensitive to
specification by implementing estimators based on nearest-neighbour matching and trimming
using the propensity score (Abadie and Imbens, 2006; Imbens, 2015).
This paper studies the distribution of public money within the city, hence it lies at the
intersection between urban economics and political economy. An important strand of this
literature asks if political factors can shape local policies. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) study how parties differ in implementing policies in the US and
Sweden, respectively, using a regression-discontinuity design. Along the same lines, Solé-Ollé
and Viladecans-Marsal (2013) show that centre-right municipal governments in Spain have
more expansive zoning policies. This literature treats municipalities as units of observation
and therefore abstracts from variation within the city boundaries in both the intensity of policy
intervention and the geographic distribution of electoral support. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to investigate partisan differences in policies inside the city.
Our paper also addresses a frequent mismatch between empirical analyses of distributional
politics and the theory invoked when interpreting the findings. As Cox (2009) points out,
several studies document whether parties target swing or core districts, but are not informative
about how resources are distributed across groups of voters.3 Most of these papers analyse the
allocation of government funds across municipalities, districts or states. For instance, Wright
(1974) uses information on New Deal spending and electoral data for US states and finds that
the democratic government in power disproportionally targets “swing states”. More recently,
Strömberg (2004) studies the allocation of the New Deal relief funds at the county level and
finds that swing counties with relatively many radio listeners receive more funds, presumably
because media presence increases the electoral impact of spending. Ansolabehere and Snyder
(2006) use data on US state expenditures across counties and find evidence in favour of the core
voters hypothesis but no evidence of swing voter targeting.4 By studying allocations across
geographical areas within municipalities, our paper avoids the problem highlighted by Cox
(2009). Census areas are not districts, counties or municipalities and have no institutional entity
of their own. This allows for a more direct mapping between the predictions of these models
and the empirical analysis. Overall, our results lend little evidence in favour of traditional core
voter models.
A growing literature shows evidence of an alignment effect in the allocation of national
transfers to local governments. For example, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) use a
difference-in-differences approach to document that Spanish municipalities aligned with upper
tier governments are favoured in the allocation of transfers. Using different research designs,
3A similar point is made in the review by Golden and Min (2013): “The weakness [of these studies] is that
results accord poorly with the individual-level theory that is usually held to be relevant.”
4An important challenge faced by this literature is to identify core and swing areas. One way to tackle this issue
is to use survey data to obtain an estimate of the distribution of voter preferences (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002).
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this effect has been documented for several countries, such as Albania (Case, 2001), Italy
(Bracco et al., 2015), Portugal (Migueis, 2013), and the United States (Levitt and Snyder,
Jr., 1995). We distinguish ourselves from this literature because, in our context, there are no
local administrative units or electoral districts between the allocating body and the spatial voter
groups that constitute our unit of observation.
2. Institutional setting
2.1. Plan E
Plan E was announced in November 2008 by the Spanish centre-left national government
of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.5 It was a large stimulus plan aimed at boosting economic
activity and fostering employment growth in the midst of the financial crisis. The plan was
carried out in two parts, starting in 2009 with FEIL, which provided municipalities with roughly
8,000 million Euros, and following, in 2010, with the smaller FEESL program, accounting for
over 4,000 millions Euros. There was an additional, yet much smaller plan affecting province
level bodies called CN over this period. Funds from FEIL and FEESL made available to
municipalities where determined by a strict per capita rule. In total, the Plan E transferred
public funds to local government for about 0.8% of the 2009 Spanish GDP.
The actual investment and spending decisions were carried out by municipalities. Municipal
governments would apply for funding of investment projects and these applications would
be approved by the central government which would finance the spending. Over 99% of
municipalities applied and received funding for investment projects, mostly for infrastructures,
each of which could not exceed 5 million Euros (see Montolio 2016).6 The near universal take
up of the plan and anecdotal evidence from local politicians we have interviewed suggests the
approval criteria were very lax and did not influence municipal decisions substantially.7 The
timing for the planning and execution of projects was very tight: after the Parliament approved
the FEIL package in the end of November 2008, municipalities had less than two months to
present investment projects and were required to start the works at the latest in mid April.
A total of 57,850 investment projects were carried out by municipal governments using
Plan E funding between 2009 and 2011. The most common projects were those described
as “rehabilitation and improvement of public spaces”, which refers to refurbishment of parks,
plazas and pedestrian walkways (see Figure B.7 in the appendix). The second most common
type was “equipment and service infrastructure” which is a much more heterogeneous category
5Formally, the name of the policy was Plan Español para el Estímulo de la Economía y el Empleo (Spanish
Plan for Employment and Economic Stimulus).
6A total of 19 municipalities did not conduct Plan E projects. In all cases, these were part of a municipal
association which itself allocated projects for municipal governments.
7A politician from the centre-right Partido Popular, talking about Plan E said: “It was an enormous grant,
which many interpreted as a letter to the three kings”. It is worth noting that the lax criteria of the national
government in the approval of projects was motivated by its desire to initiate spending as fast as possible in the
context of the economic stimulus program.
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encompassing street lighting, improvement of transport infrastructure, occasionally refurbish-
ment of parks and sport facilities as well as water works. The average cost of each project was
slightly above 210,000 euros, indicating small and middle-scale projects were common. Plan
E endowments roughly tripled the pre-crisis amount of yearly municipal funds for municipal
investments in Spain.
There are no rigorous analyses of the overall effectiveness ofPlan E on the Spanish economy.
A subsequent investigation by theCourt ofAuditors found that by 2011 only 4%of the employees
who were hired specifically to work on Plan E projects were still working for the same firm after
the program had ended. However, it is unclear whether this can be interpreted as indication of
Plan E failing in its objective to increase demand and contain the economic contraction. Plan E
data on spending at the municipal level has been recently used by Montolio (2016) to document
short term effects of these funds on local level unemployment in Catalonian municipalities.
It is important to emphasize that our paper does not evaluate Plan E in terms of its original
objectives but rather uses the data generated by Plan E as an input to study distributive policies.
2.2. Municipalities and Local Elections
Spain had 8,116 municipalities in 2011. Municipalities are the lowest level of territorial
administration of the Spanish state and have autonomy in managing their interests as recognized
in the Spanish constitution. Their functions are partly dependent on size and encompass lighting,
transport network upkeep, public parks, local services (e.g. sports facilities, public libraries),
waste disposal, water and sewage services.8 Municipal financing is based on municipal taxes
(the largest of which are a property tax and a tax on firms) and transfers from the national and
regional governments. Note that Plan E project financing was not part of these regular transfers.
The governing body is the municipal council and its members are directly elected by
residents. Municipal elections are held every four years under a single-district, closed list,
proportional electoral system.9 Municipal council seats (from aminimumof three to amaximum
of 57 in Madrid) are assigned following the D’Hondt rule. The single-district electoral rule
is important for our analysis as it allows us to treat spatial units within the municipalities as
voter groups rather than electoral districts. It also grounds the notion that all votes for a party
contribute the same towards the goal of winning government (something that does not apply in
multi-district constituencies). The municipal mayor is elected by the council under a majority
rule and in general this majority is obtained through coalition building after elections. The
council votes proposals by the mayor, who acts mainly as an the agenda-setter. Given the strong
discipline enforced by parties in Spain and the impossibility of calling early elections, local
governments are usually stable. Below, the ruling party refers to the party of the mayor.
8See details in law number 7/1985 (2 of April 1985, Ley reguladora de las bases del régimen local).
9See Chapter IV of Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General. Municipalities with populations under 250
inhabitants have an open list system with voters able to express multiple preferences for different candidates. These
municipalities will not be used in our analysis.
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For data collection and voting purposes, the National Statistical Institute (INE) divides the
Spanish territory into roughly 35,000 electoral areas (also referred to as census areas) with
no administrative powers. These areas are defined as a function of municipal boundaries and
population. Census areas are the smallest spatial unit for which we can obtain electoral results
from Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior) and will constitute our main unit of
analysis. Given that many municipalities are small, only 2,278 municipalities had more than
one census area within their boundaries in 2007.
2.3. Political Parties in 2007 and 2011
The socialist party (PSOE) held the national government between 2004 and 2011 under two
terms of President Zapatero. Plan E was formulated and executed under his presidency, in the
context of the financial crisis, with increasing unemployment and a collapsing of construction
sector. At the national level, the centre-right Popular Party (PP) was the main opposition party
and would continue to take power from the socialists in 2012.
The municipal elections before and after Plan E took place in 2007 and 2011, respectively.
In the 2007 election, the two main parties, Zapatero’s PSOE and the centre-right PP, obtained
comparable results. A total of 36% of municipalities were ruled by PSOE in 2007, while 39%
were ruled by PP. In 2011, almost three years into the financial crisis, these figures changed to
27.5% and 46.6% respectively. In both terms, the third party with most appointed mayors was
the nationalist Catalan partyConvergéncia i Uniówhich ruled 5.2% and 6.3% of municipalities,
respectively. A handful of smaller parties, either of national or regional scope, ruled most of
the remaining municipalities.
3. Data and Descriptive statistics
In order to study the relationship between public spending and the geography of voter support
we need disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and geo-located data on Plan E investment
projects. Data on individual projects were obtained directly from thePlanEwebsite, and include
the coordinates of projects (as geo-located by the municipal authorities), a short description, a
classification in terms of project types and the cost of each project. As an illustration of the
spatial variation in the data, figure 1 shows the projects located in the municipality of Sevilla.
The raw data contain a total of 57,850 projects. Several of them corresponded to investment
categories that clearly yield no differential geographical benefit to voters. For example, spending
on technological upgrading of the public administration is usually assigned to the town hall but
does not render benefits to people living next to the town hall. We identify and exclude a total of
6,574 projects which correspond to these categories.10 In addition, for a subset of projects, the
10The categories in question are: technological upgrading of the public administration, electronic management,
industrial rehabilitation, efficiency in the management of water sources, management and treatment of urban waste,
repairs in water supply systems and repairs in sewage outlet systems.
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geo-location data on latitude and longitude is incorrect or missing. When possible, we located
these projects manually using information from the short project description. In total, we were
able to hand code 3,065 projects ourselves. Our final sample therefore contains a total of 38,353
projects (for details on these restrictions see table B.1 in the appendix).
Project types in this sample and their frequencies are displayed in table 1. We can see that
the most common type of investments is related to rehabilitation of public space (an example
of which is shown in figure B.7 in the appendix). Infrastructures related to basic and cultural
services, with presumably localized benefits, are also frequent project types. We will further
explore the heterogeneity of the localized effects of different project types in section 6.
We combine information on Plan E investment projects with data on municipal and national
elections. Data on electoral outcomes at the census area level are obtained from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, the body responsible for collecting and disseminating information on electoral
results. We complement it with information on mayors and their political party of affiliation
from the same source. Figure 2 plots results of the 2007 municipal elections for each of the
522 census areas of Sevilla. Red areas are those where left-wing PSOE obtained more than
half of the votes while blue indicates area of PP majority. We can see that the support for both
parties varies significantly across the city, with the city center being mostly a centre-right area.
This within-city variation in electoral support will be instrumental to study the link between the
geography of voter support and the allocation of Plan E projects in the following sections.
Furthermore, we integrate our dataset with information from the 2001 Population Census.
Census data includes characteristics at the census areas level such as population, and density,
together with the fractions of college graduates, unemployed, home-owners, foreigners and the
number of elderlies and children. To control for possible factors affecting the local demand for
investment, we also use information on the number of households that reported the presence of
crime and a lack of green areas in the neighbourhood. Lastly, we also include the fraction of
urban discontinuous terrain at the census area level (from Corine Land Cover).
We will limit our analysis to municipalities having at least two census areas in order to
have variation in either party support or turnout within each municipality. This excludes small
and very small towns, restricting our sample to 2,278 municipalities. We will further restrict
our analysis to municipalities ruled in 2007 by one of the 9 national level parties with most
mayors.11 We impose this restriction in order to ensure we can correctly match the party names
in the census area electoral data with those appearing in the data on mayors. We will show that
our main results are robust to looking at municipalities ruled by PP or PSOE only (see section
6). Our final sample is composed of 2,047 municipalities.
Table 2 includes some descriptive statistics for our sample. As Panel A shows, census areas
have an average surface area of about 8 squared kilometers, and about 1,100 eligible voters.
11These are PP, PSOE, CIU, IU, CC, ERC, PNV, PAR and BNG. By national level parties we mean parties that
also run in national elections.
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Given that they are designed to contain comparable numbers of voters, there is substantial
variation in their physical size, matching the variation in densities, from large cities with small
census areas to sparsely populated and extended countryside villages with large ones. Panel B
indicates that 40% of census areas received at least one project, with a corresponding average
investment per capita of 215 Euros. In the last panel of table 2 we also report some average
figures from the 2001 Population Census variables that will be used as controls in our main
specification.
4. Distributive Policies
In this section we start by testing whether incumbent politicians target their core supporters
in the allocation of public works. To this end, we use within-city variation in the location of
projects with both OLS and a regression-discontinuity design. Then, we turn to the alternative
mobilization hypothesis, according to which politicians target areas of low turnout.12
4.1. Targeting Supporters
We want to test whether politicians use Plan E funds to target their supporters. At a
first glance, the correlation between some measure of the incumbent’s electoral support and
investment could be interpreted as the relevant statistic to answer this question. However, giving
this correlation a causal interpretation is problematic because of the likely omitted variable
problem, which would arise in the presence of unobservable determinants of investment that
are correlated with electoral support. For instance, if lower income areas both tend to vote left
and to need more investment, a positive correlation between the incumbent’s vote share and
investment in areas ruled by left wing mayors could exist even if there is no tactical targeting of
supporters.
We try to solve this identification problem in twoways. To start, we run awithin-municipality
regression of investment on the vote share of the incumbent – the variable we use to measure
incumbent support – at the census area level, controlling for the vote share of all the largest
parties. These vote shares serve as proxies for unobserved determinants of investment that are
correlated with the support for these parties. As a second, additional analysis, we aggregate
data at the municipal level to implement a regression-discontinuity design (RDD). Since the
ideal randomized experiment in which the location of voters is randomly assigned is unfeasible,
we resort to using close elections to “randomize” the identity of the ruling party (see, e.g. Lee
2008; Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Given the distribution of support for parties within the city,
this randomization allows us to know whether the ruling party favoured its areas of core support
in the allocation of Plan E funds.
12We have also attempted a test of the swing voter hypothesis in the spirit of Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006)
and Wright (1974). We used the historical standard deviation of the incumbents’ vote share as a proxy for the
number of swing voters. It is unclear whether this variable appropriately measures swing voter presence. With
this caveat in mind, our estimation results (not reported) lend no evidence in support of this hypothesis.
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4.1.1. Within-City Regression Analysis
We start by using disaggregated data at the census-area level directly. To this end, we
estimate the following model by OLS:
Icm = αm + βV oteShareInccm +
P∑
p=1
δpV oteSharep,cm + γ
′Xcm + cm (1)
where Icm is somemeasure of investment in census area c ofmunicipalitym and V oteShareInc
is the vote share of the incumbent’s party, defined as the ruling party at the time of Plan E
inception in late 2008. β is the coefficient of interest. A positive β implies that areas with
relatively large support for the incumbent receive, on average, more investment. We also
include amunicipality fixed effectαm to capture unobserved differences betweenmunicipalities.
Additionally, we control for the vote shares V oteSharep,cm – with p indexing parties – of each
of the main parties (as defined in section 3). We also add a set of census area characteristics,
Xcm, which includes a quadratic in population and a series of variables from the 2001 Census.13
Finally, the fraction of urban discontinuous terrain (from Corine Land Cover), distance form
the urban centroid, surface (and its square) and the density of the census area are included to
control for geographical characteristics.
Given that we introduce the vote shares of all major parties as controls (among which there
is always the incumbent’s party), identification of β comes from comparing how much voters
of a given party are rewarded with investment when this party is in power and when it is not.
Vote shares also serve as proxies for unobserved determinants of transfers that are correlated
with the electoral preferences of voters. For instance, left-wing areas may receive more funds
just because they also are areas with lower incomes. The identifying assumption, as usual, is
that, conditional on all controls and municipal effects, the vote share of the incumbent is mean
independent of the unobserved term cm.
In table 3 we report estimates using three different measures of investment as dependent
variables: a dummy for receiving at least one project, a variable that counts the number of
projects received and, finally, the ratio of Plan E spending in a given census area over the
municipal total. In addition to the municipal fixed effects, in column 1 we only include our
vector of controls X . In column 2, instead, we only include the vote shares of the main parties
as controls, whereas in column 3 we have both sets of controls. Results show that all coefficients
are negative but very small in magnitude. Taking column 3 as our preferred specification, we
see that an increase in the vote share of the incumbent by 10% is associated with a decrease
in the probability of receiving a project of 0.16 percentage points. This coefficient is very
13Specifically, in order to capture some of the differences across census areas, we add the number of unemployed,
foreign residents, home owners, college educated, elderly, and children. To control for possible factors affecting
the local demand for investment, we also control for the number of households that complained about the presence
of crime and the lack of green areas in the area.
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small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. However, given the standard error of 0.03,
and the corresponding 95% confidence interval of [-0.75,0.43] percentage points, this result
is still informative as the evidence points strongly towards an effect that is very close to zero.
Similar results are found when using alternative measures of investment as dependent variables,
suggesting that, overall, this analysis lends little support to the hypothesis that local governments
disproportionately target their supporters with investment.
4.1.2. Close elections regression-discontinuity design
Because OLS estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias, we also implement a close
elections regression-discontinuity design (RDD). Specifically, we use the fact that elections
decided by a narrow margin provide as-good-as-random variation in the identity of the ruling
party in the municipality (see e.g. Lee 2008).
To test whether the ruling party favours their voters in the allocation of Plan E funds we first
choose left-wing PSOE as our reference party because it was the party with most mayors in our
2007 sample. Then, we study whether PSOE voters disproportionately receive more funds in
municipalities where the PSOE candidate won by a small margin as compared to PSOE voters
in municipalities where the PSOE candidate barely lost.14
The first step consists in aggregating the census area information into ameasure of “supporter
bias” at the municipal level. We consider two alternatives. The first measure we construct is
meant to capture the extensivemargin of investment, that is, whether areas with many supporters
aremore likely to receive a project on average. For eachmunicipality, we calculate themunicipal
vote share of PSOE in areas that received and did not receive a project by aggregating over
census areas. Our extensive margin measure of core-voters bias in the allocation of investment
projects is then constructed as the difference in those two aggregate vote shares as follows:
ExtCoreBiasm = V oteShare
P
m − V oteShareNPm , (2)
where V oteSharePm is defined as the ratio of total PSOE votes in census areas with a PlanE
project and the total votes in those census areas. V oteShareNPm is analogously defined for
areas that did not received projects. This measure is straightforward to interpret. For example,
a value of 0.05 indicates that the vote share of PSOE was 5 percentage points larger in areas
that received at least one project than in areas that received none.15 Notice that this measure
is defined for all municipalities, including those where the left-wing party is not in power.
Therefore, even if parties favour their supporters in the allocation of projects, we should not
expect any asymmetry in the unconditional distribution of the bias measure as right-wing
governments favouring their voters would appear with negative values. In fact, this distribution,
14Note that a similar analysis could be done for the right-wing party, PP, yielding similar results (not shown).
15As a robustness check, we have also considered an alternative measure, defined as the ratio
V oteShareTm/V oteShare
NT
m instead of the difference. Results are similar and not reported.
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shown in figure B.5 in the appendix, is centred around zero and displays substantial variation
across municipalities.
We then consider a second measure of partisan bias, called IntCoreBiasm, that captures
both the extensive and the intensivemargins, that is, the decision of how much to spend. To this
end, we combine data on spending per project to information on project locations. Our measure
is defined as the municipal level correlation coefficient between the census area vote share of
the left-wing party and the fraction of total Plan E funding allocated to that census area. A high
value of this measure in a municipalities ruled by the left means that left-wing incumbents tend
to concentrate investment in areas where they have relatively many voters.
These two measures are used as outcome variables in a close election RDD to test whether
left-wing incumbents favour their voters in the allocation of projects.16 We will use the PSOE
victory margin over the second party (or the loss margin with respect to the most voted party in
case of defeat) as the running variable. Given that, under the Spanish electoral system, mayors
are elected by the municipal council and not directly by voters, this is a fuzzy regression-
discontinuity design (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The corresponding first-stage is as follows:
PSOEm = pi0 + pi11(V oteMarginPSOEm > 0) + f(V oteMarginPSOEm) + γ
′Xm + um,
(3)
where PSOEm is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE is in power in the municipality by the time
Plan E was carried out, V oteMarginPSOEm > 0 is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE was
the most voted party in the 2007 municipal elections and f(V oteMarginm) is a polynomial in
the vote margin. Xm is a vector of controls including the number of census areas, population,
and the average census area density and surface. We will use a linear control function in our
paper but results using second or third degree polynomials are analogous for all the bandwidths
we considered. Figure 4 shows that there is indeed a large discontinuity in the probability of a
PSOE government around the threshold. First-stage regressions using different bandwidths are
provided in the appendix’s table B.5 and confirm our instrument is strong in all cases.
Before moving to the second stage, we show a reduced form graph in figure 3, plotting our
extensive bias measure against the PSOE margin of victory using local polynomial smooth
regressions on either side of the thresholds to fit the data. Local means calculated in 2.5% bins
of the winning margin are presented as black dots. We can observe that there a is small negative
discontinuity in the bias measure once PSOEwins the election, suggesting that left-wingmayors
do not systematically favour areas of core support. If anything, the sign of the jump suggests
the opposite.
16An alternative approach would be to implement the RD design without aggregating, followed by clustering
standard errors at the municipal level in estimation. Results from this specification – and their interpretation – are
analogous and are reported in Appendix B.4.
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The second stage of the fuzzy RD design is given by:
Biasm =α + f(V oteMarginm) + δPSOEm + γ
′Xm + m, (4)
where the outcome variableBiasm can be eitherExtCoreBiasm or IntCoreBiasm and vector
Xm include controls as defined above. Results for IV estimates of δ for different bandwidths
around the threshold value and for both measures are reported in Table 4.
Panel A presents estimates for the outcome variable ExtCoreBiasm. We observe that
for different bandwidth values the coefficient on PSOE mayor is negative, as suggested by the
graphical analysis, but it is not statistically significant. In all cases, the coefficient is also small;
a value of -0.02 indicates that, when a municipality has a PSOE mayor, the areas receiving
projects have, on average, a 2 percentage points lower PSOE vote share than those not receiving
projects. Alternative specifications using different bandwidths or estimating the model using
the data-driven bandwidth selector method by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) lead to
similar results.
Panel B presents estimates for the alternative outcome variable IntCoreBiasm, which
incorporates both the intensive and extensive margins of investment. For ease of interpretation,
the dependent variable is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. The
estimates continue to be negative and not significant, with the coefficient on the specification
with the tightest bandwidth taking a value of 0.097, indicating that municipalities with PSOE
mayors experience an increase in the correlation between PSOE vote shares and cost shares of
roughly 0.1 of a standard deviation. Not only is this effect statistically insignificant, it is also
fairly small. Estimates for other bandwidths are somewhat larger, although still not statistically
significant. Taken together, these results complement the regression estimates and again provide
no evidence of a supporter bias.
Both the OLS andRDD results are in contrast to the predictions of core voters models such as
Cox andMcCubbins (1986), with the empirical evidence in their favour (see, e.g. Ansolabehere
and Snyder 2006, Levitt and Snyder, Jr. 1995), and with papers finding a positive alignment
effect across different levels of government. Given the previous literature, and the size and
discretionary nature of Plan E, it is somewhat surprising to find no evidence of supporter bias in
the data. However, as Cox (2009) and Golden and Min (2013) point out, using aggregated data
may lead to misleading results. Given that these data are usually only available at the district
or municipal level, a positive correlation between incumbent support and spending should not
be interpreted as evidence in favour of the core voter hypothesis. Rather, it could support the
quite different view that politicians target core districts or municipalities. Our results could
be informative in this respect because, by using disaggregated infra-municipal data on the
location of projects and voters, we are able to directly test for core supporter bias. The result
that politicians do not target their supporters also sheds some light on the motives behind the
alignment effect found in the literature, that is, the fact that national level politicians favour local
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administrations where their own party is in office. Our results suggest that this effect is more
closely related to the incentives national politicians may have to favour local party members,
such as following party guidelines, than to their intention to target their local supporters directly
to gain votes.
4.2. Mobilization
We also explore whether politicians target investment to areas of low turnout in order to
mobilize potential voters (Cox, 2009). By targeting low participation areas with investment
projects, parties can induce unmobilized supporters to show up at the polls. This strategy
will have an effect if localized investment leads voters to change their beliefs about both the
importance of their constituency in the politicians’ agenda and, more generally, the potential
effect of their vote on distributive politics.17 Webegin by studying how turnout affects investment
decisions estimating the following model:
Icm = αm + βTurnoutcm +
P∑
p=1
δpV oteSharep,cm + γ
′Xcm + cm (5)
where, as before, y is either a dummy for having received at least one project, the number
of projects received, or the share of municipal investment that is destined to census area c in
municipalitym. The coefficient of Turnout – the turnout in the 2007 municipal election – is of
interest as it measures the marginal effect of turnout on spending. As table 5 shows, we observe
a strong negative correlation between turnout and investment. This shows local governments
target areas with low electoral participation with additional investment projects. Some care is
needed, however, when giving those results a causal interpretation, as there may be omitted
variables, not controlled for by the fixed effect, that are correlated with turnout. As an example,
if areas with lower income tend to have low turnout and require more investments, turnout may
capture part of this effect and estimates would be negatively biased.
Keeping this in mind, results suggest that politicians tend to target areas of low turnout. As
the most restrictive specification of column 3 shows, a 1 percentage point increase in turnout
is associated with a 0.14 percentage points decrease in the probability of receiving a project.
This effect is not negligible: a standard deviation increase in turnout (about 12 percentage
points) corresponds to a decrease in the probability of receiving a project of approximately 1.7
percentage points.
17These campaigns may have undesirable effects if they mobilize people who support the opponent. Modern
electoral campaigns consider both persuasion and mobilization as a joint objective and are increasingly effective
(Nickerson and Rogers, 2014).
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5. Electoral Effects of Public Expenditures
After having considered the electoral determinants of investment, a natural question is
whether the strategic distribution of investment yields any electoral rewards for the incumbent
party in the following municipal elections. Specifically, we will study whether areas that
received at least one investment project reward the incumbent, either with votes or with an
increased turnout.
5.1. Effects on the Incumbent’s Vote Share
In order to estimate the effect of Plan E investment on the vote share obtained in 2011 by
the 2007 incumbent party we consider the model:
V oteShareInc2011cm = αm+βIcm+λV oteShareInc
2007
cm +
P∑
p=1
δpV oteSharep,cm+γ
′Xcm+cm
(6)
where Icm again measures investment in census area c of municipalitym. We include the same
controls as those present in section 4 plus the vote share obtained by the incumbent in 2007 and
municipal fixed effects when indicated. The coefficient of interest is β and can be interpreted
as the effect of investment on the 2011 election’s vote share of the party that was in power in
2007, conditional on the vote share they received in 2007. In this way, we are measuring the
increase in the electoral support for the incumbent’s party due to investment.18
Table 6 shows the results from estimating equation 6. The effect of investment projects
on the incumbent’s vote share in the next election is, in general, positive, but extremely small
and statistically insignificant in all specifications. To put things into perspective, the third
coefficient in the first row of the table indicates that receiving a project decreases the vote share
of the incumbent by less than 0.01 percentage points. Varying the selection of controls and
fixed effects, or the measure of Plan E investment, does not affect the main message: there
appears to be no effect of investment projects on incumbents’ vote shares within a census area.
One possible explanation for this is that our way to measure investment’s effect on voters is
inadequate. This would happen if, for instance, the benefits of receiving an investment project
were diffuse to voters other than those living in the immediate proximities. In section 6 we
will consider alternative specifications to ensure that results are robust to more general ways to
define the investment variables.
5.2. Effects on Turnout
Finally, we turn to study the effect of investment on mobilization. In section 4.2, we
showed that projects where allocated to areas of low turnout within municipalities. However,
18A related way to estimate β would be to regress the difference in vote shares (V oteShare2011 −
V oteShare2007) on Icm and controls. This procedure is similar in spirit to the first difference estimator used
in panel data, but unnecessarily imposes the restriction λ = 1. We have also considered an alternative panel
specification with census area fixed effects which leads to similar results.
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turnout is potentially correlated with many other factors (e.g. income) which in turn could
affect demand for public investment. Given this, one must be careful when interpreting those
results as evidence that politicians use investment to mobilize voters. That being said, the
mobilization hypothesis has one additional testable implication we can take to the data. If
mayors use the investment projects to foster mobilization, and this strategy were effective, we
should observe that, conditional on initial turnout, areas receiving projects exhibit higher turnout
in the following election. To study the effect of investment on 2011 turnout, we estimate
Turnout2011cm = αm + βIcm + λTurnout
2007
cm +
P∑
p=1
δpV oteSharep,cm + γ
′Xcm + cm, (7)
where Turnout2011cm and Turnout2007cm are measures of turnout in 2011 and 2007 for census area
c andmunicipalitym, and Icm, V oteSharep,cm, andXcm are defined as above. Results in table 7
show that areas that received at least one project have 0.39 percentage points additional turnout
in 2011 with respect to 2007. The effect is small but consistently positive across specifications
and for different measures of Icm, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases.
However, finding that the effect of turnout is small on average does not mean that it is so
for all census areas. To explore one dimension in which this heterogeneity might be relevant,
we introduce in the model interactions between our Plan E project measures (dummy, number
of projects and cost share) and turnout in 2007. Table 8 presents the estimates obtained once
these interactions are included. For ease of interpretation, we have demeaned the variable
Turnout2007cm , so that we can interpret the coefficient on Icm as the marginal effect evaluated at
the sample average of Turnout2007cm . The negative coefficient of the interaction term indicates
that the effect of investment is greater in areas of low turnout, showing that the largest electoral
response of spending is found in areas of low participation. Specifically, looking at column 1,
if turnout is 20 percentage points below the mean, the average effect of a project is to increase
turnout in the following election by .0037− .02 ∗ (−.2) = 0.008, that is, 0.8 percentage points.
When looking at the amount of investment, however, the effect is stronger. An increase of the
share of investment going to a particular census area by 20 percentage points above the mean
is associated with a 5 percentage points increase in turnout in the following election. These
results suggest that voters respond to localized policies by increasing their involvement in local
matters. However, they appear to do so through electoral participation rather than by rewarding
the politician responsible for the project.
But why would politicians try to mobilize voters? A possible explanation is that they believe
they will be able to mobilize voters who disproportionately vote for their party. To test this
hypothesis we augment model 6 with turnout in 2007 and its interaction with the investment
variable Icm. In this way we aim to capture whether investment affects the incumbent’s vote
share differentially depending on turnout. In all resulting estimates (unreported), the coefficient
of the interaction term is small and statistically insignificant, thus providing no evidence in
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favour of this mechanism.
Our findings on mobilization effects serve two purposes. First, they inform the literature on
turnout buying by providing evidence of the use and efficacy of municipal policies as electoral
tools to increase participation (Nichter 2008; Chen 2013), something that had not been explored
before. Secondly, they show that investment projects do lead to an active response by voters
even if not through favouring the incumbent party. Also, by showing a response in the polls,
this evidence indirectly supports our claim that projects indeed have localized effects.
6. Additional Specifications and Robustness checks
6.1. Projects with Localized Benefits
As shown in section 4, our different estimates show incumbents do not target their supporters
in the allocation of Plan E projects. However, this result implicitly rests on the assumption
that the benefits of receiving a Plan E project are limited to the census area that receives it,
hence ruling out spillovers to neighbouring areas. This is the direct consequence of how we
constructed our investment variables. However, it seems reasonable to believe that at least some
kinds of investments – such as gymnasiums or cultural centers – could provide local services
that are enjoyed by a larger constituency. Other investments, like a new road, might even benefit
other municipalities.
To ensure that our results are robust to other assumptions on how dispersed these benefits are,
we perform our analysis again by restricting our attention to types of project for which benefits
can be considered to be “broadly”, “narrowly”, or “very narrowly” localized. To classify projects
into these categories we use the project type descriptions included in the original Plan E data
source.19 Although these definitions are somewhat arbitrary, some guidance on the selection
of projects with localized benefits is offered by the literature of political budget cycles, which
suggests that spending in parks and roads is very prone to strategic manipulation because of its
visibility among voters (see for example Drazen and Eslava 2010 and Repetto 2016).
In tableB.8 of the appendixwe report the effect of the incumbent’s vote share on, respectively,
the probability of receiving a project, the number of projects and the cost share of projects
received in each census area (the equivalent to our baseline table 3). Estimates are provided
restricting the sample to broadly, narrowly and very narrowly localized project types as defined
above. Results are consistent across specifications and confirm that politicians do not target
their supporters in the allocation of Plan E funding. Table B.9 turns to study the effect of these
19In our definition of very narrowly localized benefits we restrict our attention to projects relative to i) reha-
bilitation of public space and ii) improvement in public spaces and road networks. In our definition of narrowly
localized benefits we additionally incorporate iii) conservation of historical and municipal sites and iv) protection
of historical and landscape heritage. Finally, in our definition of broadly localized benefits we add those relative
to v) basic service infrastructures, vi) cultural and sports related buildings and equipment, vii) promoting mobility
and safety, viii) urban sustainability and pollution control, ix) construction and upgrading of education centres and
x) construction and improvement of social and cultural facilities.
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types of projects on the next election’s turnout and again confirms the results we presented in
our main analysis. Projects with localized benefits increase turnout and this effect does not
depend on the measure of projects used and is fairly robust to the restriction applied to project
types. Estimates from the same analysis applied to equations 5 and 6 are also in line with the
baseline results and are omitted.
Another possibility to mitigate concerns on the dependence of our results on the way the
investment variables are defined is offered by the use of buffers. A buffer is simply an area
– in our case a circle – constructed, in the map, around each investment project point. This
procedure incorporates into our analysis the fact that the localized effects of public works in all
likelihood extend beyond the boundaries of the census area in which each project is located. By
increasing the radius of these buffers, we are assuming that the effects of investment are more
and more disperse, as more census areas will be affected. Appendix’s tables B.12 and B.13
show that, when using buffers of radius 25 or 50 meters, results are qualitatively very similar to
our baseline results. We have also used 100 meter buffers and obtained qualitatively analogous
estimates (not reported).
Taken together, these results confirm that politicians distribute investment in a way that is
completely unrelated to the location of their supporters. However, this does not mean that the
geographical distribution of resources follows no criteria. For example, by inspecting table
B.3, which shows the complete results from our baseline equation 1, we see that there is a
strong positive correlation between population and the probability of receiving a project.20 This
suggests that politicians might be targeting more populated areas, where potentially the demand
for public investment is higher and projects have more exposure.
6.2. Using matching as an alternative to regression
Census areas that receive investment projects may differ in several aspects from those that
do not. To begin with, areas in smaller cities are mechanically more likely to be “treated”
with a project for the mere fact that these cities contain few census areas. As a consequence,
treated areas will disproportionately be in small, scarcely populated municipalities. When
the distribution of covariates in the treated and control groups differs substantially, regression
models tend to rely too much on extrapolation and give biased results if the linearity assumption
is not satisfied. To address this problem, in this section we draw from the literature on treatment
effects to re-estimate some of the models used in the previous sections using different methods
which are robust to covariate imbalances. In particular, we reconsider models 6 and 7, where
we considered the electoral effects of expenditures. In order to have a binary treatment, we use
the dummy for receiving at least one project as the treatment variable.
20The effect is marginally decreasing as the coefficient of the squared population is negative and significant, but
continues to be positive even in the 99th percentile of the census area population distribution (0.164− 2× 0.012×
3.004 = 0.0929). The raw correlation between population and the number of projects received in a census area is
0.16.
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To start with, we estimate the propensity score - defined as the probability of receiving an
investment project conditional on a set of covariates - using a logit model. Specifically, for
model 6, we calculate the propensity score using a subset of the controls in equations 6 and
7: population, surface, density, the 2001 Census demographic indicators, the vote shares of
all major parties, plus the vote share of the incumbent in 2007.21 One way to measure the
imbalance between the covariates in the two groups is to calculate, for each covariate k, the
normalized difference, defined as
∆k =
X¯T,k − X¯C,k√
(S2T,k − S2C,k)/2
,
where the numerator is the difference between the sample means of treated and control units
while the terms in the denominators are the corresponding sample variances (Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009).
In table 9 we see that in the original sample those differences exceed, in a few cases, the
recommended value of 0.25 (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), suggesting imperfect overlap.
For example, areas that receive a project are substantially larger and less densely populated,
on average, than those that do not. After trimming the sample by dropping observations with
extreme values of the propensity score, the balance improves for some variables (see column
2).22 Results improve by trimming the sample further, as shown in the rightmost column of
table 9. This result motivates us to use the interval [0.3, 0.7], rather than the optimally calculated
boundaries, as our trimmed sample in the following. The table of normalized differences for
model 7 is very similar and hence omitted.
In column 2 of table 10 we see that the OLS estimate of the effect of a project on the next
election’s vote share is reduced when trimming the sample by keeping only census areas with
propensity score between 0.3 and 0.7, and is still insignificantly different from zero. The same
message is confirmed by using propensity score matching on the trimmed sample (column
3), nearest neighbour matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) using the full sample (column 4)
or requiring neighbours to be from the same province (column 5) or municipality (column 6,
sample is restricted to large municipalities with at least 50 census areas).23
For what concerns the effects on turnout, we see from table 11 that the positive effect we
found in section 5 is robust. Using the trimmed sample or variations of nearest-neighbour
matching yield coefficients that are still significant albeit somewhat smaller. The results in this
21The use of only a subset of covariates is necessary in order to avoid the curse of dimensionality problem in
the subsequent analysis using nearest neighbour matching.
22The optimal boundaries for trimming are obtained using Crump et al. (2009)’s procedure.
23All estimations are performed using Stata 14’s command teffects. The nearest neighbour specifications use the
bias adjustment correction, based on all the covariates used for matching, suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006).
Notice that the number of observations varies because when the algorithm fails to find an appropriate match for a
given census area, this is dropped from estimation.
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subsection suggest that, overall, the OLS estimates we obtained in our main specifications are
not excessively sensitive to the choice of a linear functional form.
6.3. Other robustness checks
In table B.10 we estimate models 1, 5, 6 and 7 by restricting the sample to province capitals.
All qualitative results are preserved. As an additional robustness check we restrict our sample
to municipalities ruled by either a PSOE or a PP mayor. Table B.11 is in line with our
baseline estimates, suggesting that our results are not driven by municipalities ruled by smaller
or occasionally “fringe” parties. Finally, we consider an alternative to specification 1 in which
we use the incumbent’s vote share averaged over the 2008, 2007, 2004 and 2003 national and
municipal elections. Estimates are reported in table B.2 in the appendix show our main results
are not sensitive to the way we measure political support.
7. Conclusions
In 2009 and 2010, the Spanish government carried out a large scale stimulus program that
transferred 12 billion euros to municipalities to increase infrastructure spending and foster
employment. This policy provides an ideal setting to analyse how local politicians distribute
resources to voters within cities. In the first place, the allocation of funds to municipalities
was made on a per-capita basis, mitigating concerns about endogenous take up. Secondly,
municipalities enjoyed substantial discretion in deciding how and where to allocate investment.
And finally, investment projects were geo-located, enabling us to assign each of them to finely
disaggregated electoral areas.
We find that the spatial allocation of spending within municipalities is not affected by
the geography of political support, as shown by estimates from census-area level regressions,
RDD and matching methods. However, we show that investment goes disproportionately to
areas of low turnout, suggesting that politicians use funds to increase participation. Data on
subsequent electoral results confirm this hypothesis, by providing evidence that voters respond
to local spending by increasing turnout. This increase in participation is found to be especially
significant in areas with low initial turnout.
Our results contribute to the still very incomplete understanding of how electoral conditions
and incentives shape the allocation of investments within the city. Despite the importance of
local investment on national spending, the lack of data at a sufficiently disaggregated level has
hampered the study of these issues. The previous evidence of tactical distribution of resources
between different levels of government does not hold when looking at the distribution of these
resources to groups of voters. The channel through which distributive policies affect electoral
outcomes operates by changing voters’ participation decision and not their attitude towards
the incumbent. We interpret this as a signal that agents will become more sensitive to the
local level political agenda when observing the actual policies taking place. This suggests that
localized investment can change the perception of voters about how much they can influence
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politicians’ allocations, thus generating a reaction in the polls. Our paper makes a first attempt
at uncovering how distributive politics operate at the very local level. Further understanding of
the determinants of local level investment decisions and their electoral effects remains an open
topic for future research.
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8. Figures & Tables
Figure 1
Plan E Projects: Sevilla
Notes: Points correspond to different Plan E projects located in the municipality of Sevilla in Andalucía. Polygons
correspond to the different census areas comprising this municipality.
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Figure 2
2007 vote shares: Sevilla
Legend
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0 3 61.5 Kilometers
Notes: Census areas shaded in blue are those in which PP (centre-right) was the most voted party in the 2007
municipal elections. Census areas shaded in red are those in which PSOE (centre-left) was the most voted party.
Different shades indicate different vote shares as shown in the legend.
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Figure 3
Reduced Form Graph for the intensive margin measure
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Notes: Vertical axis plots our extensive margin measure of core-support bias, ExtCoreBiasm, equal to the
difference in PSOE vote share between areas that received and not received projects. The horizontal axis mea-
sures the difference in vote shares obtained by PSOE in the 2007 municipal elections relative to the runner-up
party if PSOE won the election (positive values) or the winning party if PSOE lost the election (negative values).
Solid lines represent fitted values from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated with an Epanechnikov
kernel independently on both sides of the threshold. Dots represent averages within intervals of 2.5% of the vote
margin. Dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 4
First Stage Discontinuity
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the probability of having a PSOE mayor and horizontal axis measures the dif-
ference in vote shares obtained by PSOE in the 2007 municipal elections relative to the runner-up party if PSOE
won the election (positive values) or the most voted party if PSOE lost the election (negative values). Solid
lines represent fitted values from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel.
Dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 1
Descriptives - Summary of Project Types
N. of projects Frequency
Rehabilitation of public space 7107 18.53
Basic services infrastructure 5924 15.45
Construction and improvement of social and cultural facilities 5819 15.17
Cultural and sport related buildings and equipment 3946 10.29
Energy efficiency and conservation 3813 9.94
Improvement in public spaces and road networks 2423 6.32
Social buildings and equipment 1718 4.48
Construction and upgrading of education centres 1385 3.61
Urban sustainability and pollution control 875 2.28
Promoting mobility and safety 853 2.22
Protection of historical and landscape heritage 767 2
Conservation of historical and municipal sites 569 1.48
Other 3154 8.22
Notes: Number and relative frequency for all the investment projects, by project type. Sample restricted to projects
which have correct geocoding information. All municipalities.
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Table 2
Descriptives - Census area level data
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
A. General information
Surface (2007, km2) 8.41 34.69 0.004 1125.112
Density (2007, 1000 inh./km2) 19.86 21.55 0.001 349.804
Population (2007) 1,423 563.75 294 12,859
Eligible voters (2007) 1,100 441.03 226 10,881
Turnout (2007) 0.61 0.12 0.085 0.922
Turnout (2011) 0.62 0.10 0.157 1.000
B. Plan E projects
Indicator for receiving 1+ projects 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
N. of projects received 0.91 1.72 0.00 49.00
Investment in projects (Euros per capita) 214.76 713.16 0.00 33420.26
C. Population Census information (2001)
Higher education 0.12 0.10 0.000 0.556
Home owners 0.84 0.12 0.004 1.000
Foreigners 0.04 0.05 0.000 0.811
Households with 1+ unemployed 0.16 0.07 0.003 0.730
Households reporting not enough green areas 0.38 0.24 0.000 0.993
Households reporting crime is high 0.24 0.19 0.000 0.977
People 0-16 yrs. 0.15 0.05 0.031 0.394
People 16-64 yrs. 0.67 0.05 0.280 0.927
People 65+ yrs. 0.17 0.08 0.006 0.654
Observations 28,083
Notes: Panel A reports national averages for some characteristics of interest for the 28,083 census areas in the
sample (2,047 municipalities). Turnout figures refer to the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections, respectively. Panel
B shows descriptives for the Plan E investment program, and panel C shows data from the 2001 Population Census.
Figures represent the national average of the fraction of people, in given census area, with a particular characteristic
at the time of the Census. In some categories – explicitly indicated – the unit of observation is the household and
not the individual.
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Table 3
Effect of incumbent’s vote share on the propensity to invest
(1) (2) (3)
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.039 -0.024 -0.016
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.28 0.33
Observations 27892 27903 27892
N. projects N. projects N. projects
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.154 -0.059 -0.059
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.38 0.34 0.38
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Inv. share Inv. share Inv. share
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.005 -0.006 -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.45 0.44 0.45
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. As
dependent variable we use, respectively: in the first panel, a dummy equal to one if the census area received at least
one investment project; in the second, the number of investment projects; and, finally, in the third, the fraction of
the Plan E municipal investment that goes to the census area. Electoral controls include the vote shares of all 9
major parties (see section 3).
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Table 4
Effect of PSOE victory on spending bias measures - Intensive and extensive margin
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05 bw=CCT
A. Supporter Bias - Extensive Margin
PSOE mayor -0.010 -0.020 -0.041 -0.019 -0.036
(0.010) (0.018) (0.029) (0.031) (0.023)
Bandwidth 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.22
Observations 1304 886 394 199 791
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05 bw=CCT
B. Supporter Bias - Intensive Margin
PSOE mayor 0.044 -0.199 -0.221 0.097 -0.316
(0.150) (0.256) (0.394) (0.483) (0.301)
Bandwidth 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.18
Observations 1929 1320 589 300 1012
Notes: Robust s.e in parentheses. Controls included in all specifications. In the rightmost column the bandwidth is
chosen automatically using the method by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The number of observations in
panel A is lower for all bandwidths because municipalities in which either all or none of the census areas received
a project are excluded from estimation.
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Table 5
The effect of turnout on the propensity to invest
(1) (2) (3)
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Turnout 2007 -0.136*** -0.223*** -0.141***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.28 0.33
Observations 27892 27903 27892
N. projects N. projects N. projects
Turnout 2007 -0.848*** -1.048*** -0.870***
(0.26) (0.23) (0.25)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.38 0.34 0.38
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Inv. share Inv. share Inv. share
Turnout 2007 -0.104*** -0.111*** -0.107***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.45 0.44 0.45
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. As
dependent variable we use, respectively: in the first panel, a dummy equal to one if the census area received at least
one investment project; in the second, the number of investment projects; and, finally, in the third, the fraction of
the Plan E municipal investment that goes to the census area.
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Table 6
Effect of investment projects on next elections’ results
(1) (2) (3)
Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011
Project 1/0 0.00005 -0.00041 -0.00004
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011
N. projects 0.00024 0.00013 0.00024
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011 Vote sh. in 2011
Inv. share 0.00132 -0.00009 0.00120
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. As
dependent variable we use, respectively: in the first panel, a dummy equal to one if the census area received at least
one investment project; in the second, the number of investment projects; and, finally, in the third, the fraction of
the Plan E municipal investment that goes to the census area.
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Table 7
Effect of investment projects on 2011 turnout
(1) (2) (3)
Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011
Project 1/0 0.0040*** 0.0023*** 0.0039***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.88 0.86 0.89
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011
N. projects 0.0013*** 0.0008*** 0.0012***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.88 0.86 0.89
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011
Inv. share 0.0072*** 0.0064*** 0.0067***
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.88 0.86 0.89
Observations 27880 27891 27880
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. As
dependent variable we use, respectively: in the first panel, a dummy equal to one if the census area received at least
one investment project; in the second, the number of investment projects; and, finally, in the third, the fraction of
the Plan E municipal investment that goes to the census area.
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Table 8
Effect of investment projects on 2011 turnout - interactions
Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011 Turnout 2011
Project 1/0 0.0037***
(0.001)
Proj.1/0 × Turnout 2007 -0.0203
(0.015)
N. projects 0.0013***
(0.000)
N.Proj. × Turnout 2007 -0.0062**
(0.003)
Inv. share 0.0189***
(0.004)
Inv. share × Turnout 2007 -0.1671***
(0.031)
Turnout 2007 0.3034*** 0.3018*** 0.3084***
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89
Observations 27880 27880 27880
Notes: Municipality fixed effects and controls are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal
level. The dependent variable is 2011 turnout in all specifications. The variable Turnout2007cm is demeaned, so that
that the baseline coefficient of each of the investment variables can be interpreted as the marginal effect evaluated
at the sample average of Turnout2007cm .
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Table 9
Normalized differences for each covariates - vote shares equation
Original sample .11<e(X)<.89 .3<e(X)<.7
Population (2007) 0.349 0.275 0.054
Surface (c.area) 0.338 0.371 0.254
Density, 1000 inh/km2 (c.area) -0.918 -0.802 -0.418
Vote share of PP (in c.area) -0.197 -0.183 -0.046
Vote share of PSOE (in c.area) 0.069 0.071 0.010
Vote share of CIU (in c.area) -0.014 0.017 0.044
Vote share of IU (in c.area) -0.005 0.003 -0.013
Vote share of PNV (in c.area) -0.065 -0.049 -0.041
Vote share of BNG (in c.area) 0.098 0.075 0.036
Vote share of CC (in c.area) 0.048 0.027 0.019
Vote share of ERC (in c.area) 0.033 0.059 0.043
Vote share of PAR (in c.area) 0.067 0.042 -0.006
Fraction of HH reporting high crime -0.485 -0.409 -0.208
Fraction of HH with 1+ unemployed 0.029 0.014 -0.033
Fraction of HH declaring not enough green -0.013 -0.005 -0.015
Fraction of home owners 0.061 0.035 0.003
Fraction of foreigners -0.132 -0.069 -0.004
Fraction of people 0-16 yrs. 0.322 0.209 0.000
Fraction of people 65+ yrs. -0.044 0.001 0.105
Fraction of ref. persons with higher educ. -0.373 -0.321 -0.126
Vote share incumbent (2007) -0.011 0.001 -0.019
Observations 28083 24187 14830
Notes: For each element of the covariates vectorX , the normalized difference is defined as the difference between
the average in the treatment and control group, rescaled by the square root of the average difference of the sample
variances:
X¯T,k − X¯C,k√
(S2T,k − S2C,k)/2
In the second column one can notice the improvement in balance when using the trimmed sample restricted to
observations with propensity score e(X) between 0.103 and 0.897 (see Crump et al. 2009 for details on how to
calculate these bounds). In the third column the trimmed sample is manually set to 0.3 < e(X) < 0.7.
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Table 10
Electoral effects of investment on 2011 vote shares - alternative estimation
procedures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS (trim) PS (trim) NN NN-prov. NN-munic.
Project 1/0 0.0028 0.00100 -0.0020 0.0018 0.00038 0.000042
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Vote share inc.(2007) 0.76*** 0.74***
(0.0270) (0.0262)
R2 0.63 0.58
Observations 27880 14830 14830 27880 27880 14735
Notes: The dependent variable is the vote share of the 2007 municipal incumbent in the subsequent 2011 election.
Column 1 replicates the first column of table 6 as reference. The second column uses the same specification but
using a trimmed sample for which the propensity score is between 0.3 and 0.7. Column 3 reports results for a
propensity-score matching model using the same trimmed sample. Columns 4 to 6 all use the nearest neighbour
matching method of Abadie and Imbens (2006) with one neighbour, respectively, using the full sample (column
4), requiring matches to be from the same province (5) or the same municipality (6). Standard errors are clustered
at the municipality level in columns 1-2 and heteroskedasticity-robust in the others.
Table 11
Electoral effects of investment on 2011 turnout - alternative estimation
procedures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS (trim) PS (trim) NN NN-prov. NN-munic.
Project 1/0 0.012*** 0.0099*** 0.0100*** 0.0050*** 0.0043*** 0.0018*
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Turnout 2007 0.56*** 0.59***
(0.0252) (0.0146)
R2 0.74 0.73
Observations 27880 14656 14656 27880 27880 14735
Notes: The dependent variable is the turnout in the 2011 municipal election. Column 1 replicates the first column
of table 6 as reference. The second column uses the same specification but using a trimmed sample for which the
propensity score is between 0.3 and 0.7. Column 3 reports results for a propensity-score matching model using
the same trimmed sample. Columns 4 to 6 all use the nearest neighbour matching method of Abadie and Imbens
(2006) with one neighbour, respectively, using the full sample (column 4), requiring matches to be from the same
province (5) or the same municipality (6). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level in columns 1-2
and heteroskedasticity-robust in the others.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Data sources
Municipality codes and names; population
To have a reliable list of municipality names and official municipality and province codes,
we use the INE list of all Spanish municipalities for the years 2001-2011.
URL: http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/codmun11/11codmunmapa.htm
Population data at the municipal level is available from 1996 onwards at the Padrón continuo
municipal de habitantes:
URL: http://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.html?padre=517&dh=1
Census area maps (shapefiles)
To be able to connect electoral data (available at the census area level) and the investment
projects (geolocated with latitude and longitude), we need map shapefiles with the borders of
each census area. Since boundaries usually change over time, we need to have updated maps for
each municipal election year (2007 and 2011) before and after the Plan E investment program.
The 2011 shapefile with all census areas is freely available at the following url:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_resultados_seccen.htm
We also purchased the map for 2007 directly from INE, which we use as a reference in all
the empirical analysis. In order to be able to assign the data from the 2001 Census to the 2007
census areas, we also bought the shapefile map for 2001 from the same source.
Plan E Investment data
The Plan-E data on investment projects with geographical coordinates and amount were
downloaded by hand from:
URL: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/fondosinversionlocal/utilidades/geolocalizacion-de-
proyectos.html
and saved as a .csv directly. Each investment project comes with, among other variables, the
geographical coordinates. Those coordinates are then used, together with the 2007 shapefile, in
ArcGIS to overlay the investment project data (as a “point layer”) with the census area polygons
as described below.
Electoral data
The electoral data are at the "Mesa" level (= polling stations, within-municipality) for several
municipal and national elections. Data are then aggregated at the census area level in order
to have the same level of aggregation of the shapefiles and the Census data. Each census area
usually contains just a handful of polling stations, so the amount of aggregation is minimal.
URL: http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/areaDescarga.html?method=search
There, we downloaded electoral results for the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 municipal
election, plus the 2000, 2004 and 2008 national elections, both at the disaggregated “mesa”
level and at the municipal level.
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Those data lack information on the identity of the mayor in each year and on the correspond-
ing party in power, so we obtain such information using data from
URL: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/en/web/areas/politica_local/sistema_de_informacion_local_-
SIL-/datos_legislaturas_1979_2015.html
Census area dataWedownloaded some variables, used as controls in the empirical analysis,
from the 2001 Population census directly from the INE website:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censo/es/inicio.jsp
We obtain population data at the census area level for 2007 and 2011 from:
URL: http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase&L=0
Finally, we obtain information fromCorine Land cover on the fraction of urban discontinuous
terrain.
URL: http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/clc-2006-vector-data-version-6
Data restrictions
Our final dataset is based on the 2007 census areas for which we have information on
the geographical boundaries (and coordinates). These areas are those that appear in the 2007
shapefile from INE. Of the 35,323 census areas in this dataset, we drop 5,833 belonging to
municipalities with only one census area. Then, we drop municipalities where the mayor does
not belong to any of the 9 largest parties, as defined in section 3 in the main text. By doing this,
we lose 1,405 additional areas. Finally, we drop the municipality of “"Mañón”, because there is
a conflict between the map – which has it divided in two census areas – and the electoral data,
where it appears as having just one.
Regarding the projects data, the original data has 57,850 of them but 15,682 of them are
incorrectly geo-located. We drop 6,574 projects that have no localized benefits, such as those
related to modernization of the electronic equipment of municipal buildings or to sewage works.
With the help of a research assistant, we went through all the remaining projects with incorrect
geo-coding and we were able to hand-code roughly one-fifth of them. ArcGIS is used to assign
all the 38,353 correctly geo-localized projects (which are points with geographical coordinates)
to census areas (areas with polygon boundaries).
After this step, we have a dataset at the census area level. We replace all the Plan E variables
(such as the dummy for receiving at least one project) with zeros if a given census area did not
receive any project. In the special case in which we observe, in our sample, that the whole
municipality carried out no investment projects at all, we replace all variables asmissing instead.
This is the case for 28 municipalities.
Construction of the final dataset
The basis of our dataset are the 35,323 census areas in which Spain was divided as of 2007,
as they appear in the INE shapefile. To assign investment projects – which come with latitude
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and longitude – to census areas we need information on the exact boundaries of each area,
obtained from a shapefile for all 2007 census areas. Using ArcGIS 10.3.1, we overlay the point
layer (that is, the dataset of geolocated project points) to the map of census areas. ArcGIS then
calculates how many project points fall into each census areas, and the total cost. Finally, it
saves the resulting dataset as a comma-separated values file that can be read by STATA.
The electoral data for 2007 are then directly merged using a unique census area identifier
(labelled CUSEC in the raw data) to the main dataset. A slight complication arises when one
tries to merge information for other years (such as, for instance, the 2001 Population Census
data or electoral data for other years) to the 2007 census area dataset, because the boundaries
of the census areas change over time. To be able to merge data from other years with the 2007
dataset, we create, for each year in which a map shapefile is available (2001 and 2011), a dataset
that links the census areas boundaries to the 2007 ones. These two datasets allow us to directly
link data for 2001 and 2011 to the 2007 census areas.
As an illustration on how census areas are linked across different years, consider the case
in which the 2001 census area A is divided in two areas in 2007, B with surface 9/10 of the
original one, and C with surface 1/10. Imagine that we want to have the variable “number of
foreigners”, only available for 2001, for all the 2007 census areas. Assume, for the sake of the
example, that the number of foreigners living in area A was 100 in 2001. To assign this number
to the new 2007 boundaries, we simply assume that those people are uniformly located in space.
Hence, we assign 90 of them to areaB and the remaining 10 to areaC.24 This simple procedure
allows us to obtain a single cross-section for the 2007 census areas with several variables from
other years, with the advantage of having kept the geographical boundaries constant.
Appendix B. Additional results
Appendix B.1. Projects Descriptives
Table B.1 presents descriptives for all projects and projects in our sample, respectively. The
difference between two samples corresponds to projects for which geo-coding is not available
and projects which should not have a geographically precise impact on municipal residents (for
instance, improvements to the town hall internet connection, etc.). In our sample we also drop
all projects of the CN investment program, because it was a plan meant to distribute resources
to provincial rather than municipal authorities. Likewise, we exclude projects executed by
associations of municipalities as we cannot attribute to these associations a single incumbent
party. We have a total of 38,353 correctly geocoded projects roughly equally divided between
the two Plan E programs (FEIL and FEESL). Our sample of correctly geocoded projects covers
7,210 municipalities (90% of the total). The average project costs 244 thousand euros, with
24For the years in which no shapefile is available, we first merge to the closest year available and then apply the
described procedure.
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projects being slightly more costly in FEIL than FEESL. Comparing panels A and B of Table
B.1 we can note that projects that are not in our sample are slightly cheaper on average.
Table B.1
Descriptives statistics on investment projects
All FEIL FEESL CN
A. All projects
Cost in million euros 12308 7933 4232 143
Participating municipalities 8097 8058 8067 713
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 213 260 168 69
N. of projects 57850 30566 25214 2070
B. Only correctly geocoded projects
Cost in million euros 9376 6270 3106
Participating municipalities 7210 6879 8023
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 244 292 184
N. of projects 38353 21460 16893
Appendix B.2. Additional OLS results
In this short appendix we provide some figures and tables that complement the results in the
paper. Table B.2 replicates results showing the partial correlation between mayor vote shares
and projects as discussed in section 4. Instead of using the incumbent party’s 2007 vote share
we use the mean vote share obtained in the last four elections, obtaining results analogous to
the baseline estimates in table 3. Table B.3 is the complete version of the first panel of table 3,
where the dependent variable is a dummy for receiving one or more projects.
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Table B.2
Effect of incumbent’s vote share on the propensity to invest - using means
(1) (2) (3)
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Vote Share Inc.(mean) -0.038 -0.026 -0.017
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.28 0.33
Observations 27892 27903 27892
N. projects N. projects N. projects
Vote Share Inc.(mean) -0.203 -0.107 -0.100
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.38 0.34 0.38
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Inv. share Inv. share Inv. share
Vote Share Inc.(mean) -0.006 -0.009 -0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.45 0.44 0.45
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in column 2 and 3. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. The
variable Vote Share Inc. is the average vote share of the incumbent party in 2008 taken over the previous four
elections (both municipal and national: 2008, 2007, 2004 and 2003).
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Table B.3
Effect of incumbent’s vote share on the propensity to invest - full table
(1) (2) (3)
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.039 -0.024 -0.016
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population (2007) 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.01) (0.01)
Population sq. (2007) -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.00) (0.00)
Fraction of HH reporting high crime 0.061** 0.064**
(0.03) (0.03)
Fraction of HH with 1+ unemployed -0.115 -0.122*
(0.08) (0.07)
Fraction of HH declaring not enough green -0.015 -0.016
(0.02) (0.02)
Fraction of home owners -0.165*** -0.160***
(0.03) (0.03)
Fraction of foreigners -0.031 -0.032
(0.11) (0.11)
Fraction of people 0-16 yrs. -0.466*** -0.481***
(0.11) (0.12)
Fraction of people 65+ yrs. 0.005 0.010
(0.09) (0.09)
Fraction of ref. persons with higher educ. -0.045 -0.016
(0.06) (0.07)
Fraction of Urban Discontinuous Terrain -0.023** -0.023*
(0.01) (0.01)
Distance to closest Urban Centre -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Surface (c.area) 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.00) (0.00)
Surface squared (c.area) -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.00) (0.00)
Density, 1000 inh/km2 (c.area) -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00)
Vote share of PP (in c.area) -0.256*** -0.168**
(0.09) (0.08)
Vote share of PSOE (in c.area) -0.341*** -0.135
(0.08) (0.08)
Vote share of CIU (in c.area) -0.086 -0.135
(0.18) (0.14)
Vote share of IU (in c.area) -0.094 -0.125
(0.13) (0.11)
Vote share of PNV (in c.area) -0.103 0.025
(0.15) (0.14)
Vote share of BNG (in c.area) 0.114 0.020
(0.22) (0.23)
Vote share of CC (in c.area) -0.269 -0.123
(0.20) (0.20)
Vote share of ERC (in c.area) 0.107 0.225
(0.19) (0.18)
Vote share of PAR (in c.area) -0.346 -0.706
(0.62) (0.67)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.28 0.33
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Notes: Municipality fixed effects are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level. Population is in thousand
inhabitants. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the census are received at least one project.
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Appendix B.3. Additional RDD Results - Municipal Level
Figure B.5 displays the distribution of the extensive margin bias measures used as a depen-
dent variable in our RDD estimates in section 4. A municipality with a bias equal to 0.01 is one
in which the vote share of PSOE in census areas that received at least one project is 1% greater,
on average, than the vote shares in untreated areas. The distribution is roughly symmetric
around zero, suggesting that there is no disproportionate favouring of areas with many PSOE
(left-wing) voters in the whole sample.
In figure B.6 and in table B.4 we report balancing checks for the controls variables used in
the RDD model in the paper. All variables appear to be balanced around the threshold.
Table B.5 presents first stage regressions for the IV estimates using close election RD
provided in section 4.1.2 (see equation 3). In all columns the dependent variable is a dummy
taking value 1 if the municipality is ruled by a PPmayor in the onset of Plan E. We can see that
for all bandwidths the variable 1(V ote Margin > 0) has a positive and strongly significant
coefficient. F-statistics provided in the table indicate that the instrument is strong for all selected
bandwidths.
Figure B.5
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Histogram of the bias measure defined in equation 2. High values correspond to municipalities in which projects
where disproportionately allocated to areas of strong support for the left-wing party PSOE.
Appendix B.4. Additional RDD Results - Census Area Level
In this section we estimate an RD model using data at the census area level, as an alternative
to the municipal-level RD approach pursued in section 4.1.2. Specifically, we estimate the
model detailed in equations 3 and 4 by using control variables measured at the census area level,
and by adapting the definition of our dependent variables to the census area level. As dependent
variables we define three different measures of core-voters bias, similar in spirit to the ones used
in the main analysis. Our first measure is constructed as the interaction of a dummy that equals
one if the census area received at least onePlan E project and a dummy that equals one if the vote
share of PSOE in the census area is higher than the municipal average. As a second measure,
we use an interaction between the same project dummy and the difference between the vote share
of PSOE in the census area and the municipal average. Lastly, we use the interaction between
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Figure B.6
Balance of covariates checks
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RDD balancing checks for each covariate used in the RDD estimation. Dots represent averages within intervals of
2.5% of the vote margin. Solid lines represent fitted values from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated
with an Epanechnikov kernel. Shaded areas correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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Table B.4
Balance of covariates checks - regressions
Population Surface Density Elderly Children
PSOE vote share >= 0.5 3.454 1.712 0.050 0.009 -0.008
(12.111) (5.990) (1.250) (0.011) (0.005)
R2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 598 598 598 598 598
Homeown. No green Unemp. Crime Foreigners
PSOE vote share >= 0.5 -0.014 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.002
(0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 598 598 598 598 598
Notes: Robust s.e in parentheses. Coefficients are the estimated jump in each covariate at the threshold of winning
margin equal to zero, using a local linear regression with bandwidth equal to 10% at each side. Population is in
thousands, surface in km2, density in thousands of inhabitants/km2, and the rest of the variables are fractions of
total municipal population. Results using different bandwidth are analogous.
Table B.5
First stage for the RDD analysis of core voters bias
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05
1(V ote Margin_m > 0) 0.537*** 0.414*** 0.426*** 0.510***
(0.030) (0.042) (0.070) (0.098)
F-statistic 321 96 37 27
R2 0.69 0.56 0.35 0.29
Observations 1956 1339 598 305
Notes: Robust s.e. in parenthesis. In all columns the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the
municipality is ruled by a PSOE mayor in the onset of Plan E. From left to right, we restrict the sample to elections
in which the absolute value of the vote margin was less than 50, 25, 10 and 5% respectively. Robust s.e. in
parenthesis. The F − test for the null of no jump in the probability of the left-wing party obtaining the mayor
office at the discontinuity is reported for different bandwidth choices.
the project dummy and the difference between the vote share of PSOE and the fraction of
the census area population over the municipal total. Although they are constructed in different
ways, all these variables are meant to measure a bias in Plan E investment towards PSOE
areas. Furthermore, they are all standardized to facilitate the interpretation, so that all the RDD
estimates of the effect of having a PSOEmayor can be interpreted in terms of standard deviation
of the dependent variable. A positive coefficient would then be evidence that PSOE mayors
favour areas with relatively many voters. To give each municipality the same importance in
estimation, we weighted each census area by the ratio of its population to the municipal total.
First and second stage results from this fuzzy RDD model are reported in tables B.6 and B.7,
respectively, and are in line with those from our municipal-level RDD analysis performed in
section 4.1.2. Coefficients are not significant in all but one specification and the point estimates
are small, with the measure of bias towards PSOE voters increasing by less than a fifth of a
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within-municipality standard deviation when a candidate from this party wins the election by
a small margin. Our results once again show little evidence in favour of a supporter bias by
PSOE mayors, irrespectively of the measure used or of the bandwidth.
Table B.6
Effect of PSOE victory on spending bias measures - Census Area Level (First Stage)
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05
1(V ote Margin_m > 0) 0.540*** 0.419*** 0.435*** 0.505***
(0.030) (0.042) (0.069) (0.096)
F-statistic 327 101 39 28
R2 0.69 0.56 0.34 0.28
Observations 27691 19437 9887 6204
Notes: Census-area level regressions. S.e clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Each observation is
weighted by the fraction of municipal population in each census area so that all municipalities have equal weight.
In all columns the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the municipality is ruled by a PSOE mayor in
the onset of Plan E. From left to right, we restrict the sample to elections in which the absolute value of the vote
margin was less than 50, 25, 10 and 5% respectively. The F − test for the null of no jump in the probability of the
left-wing party obtaining the mayor office at the discontinuity is reported for different bandwidth choices.
Appendix B.5. Additional Robustness Checks
Tables B.8 and B.9 display the estimates for different definitions of projects types with local-
ized benefits, as discussed in section 6. In table B.8 we focus on testing whether the incumbent
targets areas of strong electoral support within the municipality using our specification with
municipal fixed effects. Consistently with the findings elsewhere in the paper, we find that local
governments do not favour their voters in the allocation of Plan E projects. Alternatively, in
B.9 we present results for the effect of localized projects on turnout. Again, consistently with
other results in our paper, we find statistically significant and relatively small effects of projects
on turnout.
Table B.10 presents a summary of our results focusing exclusively on big cities where we
include in our sample all province capitals. Column 1 shows that the partial correlation between
incumbent’s vote share and the allocation of projects is negative and not significant. Column 2
shows politicians disproportionately allocate projects to low turnout areas and column 4 shows
that conditional on initial turnout, areas that received projects have higher turnout in subsequent
elections.
Table B.11 presents a summary of our results focusing exclusively on cities ruled by the
two main Spanish parties, the center-right PP and the center-left PSOE. Column 1 shows that
the partial correlation between incumbent’s vote share and the allocation of projects is still
negative and not significant. Column 2 shows politicians disproportionately allocate projects
to low turnout areas and column 4 shows that conditional on initial turnout, areas that received
projects have higher turnout in subsequent elections.
Finally, tables B.12 and B.13 summarizes results using 25 meter and 50 meter buffers along
projects to measure the census areas that where benefited by Plan E. We can observe that all
qualitative results remain unchanged, with only minor changes in the point estimates. We
have also produced a similar table using 100 meter bandwidths (not shown) and results remain
unchanged. If anything, the coefficients that are significantly different from zero are larger in
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Table B.7
Effect of PSOE victory on spending bias measures - Census Area Level
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05
A. First measure
PSOE mayor -0.023 0.054 0.203** 0.095
(0.038) (0.064) (0.094) (0.110)
Bandwidth 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05
Observations 26798 18854 9574 6078
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05
B. Second measure
PSOE mayor 0.056 0.103 0.125 0.139
(0.064) (0.102) (0.145) (0.172)
Bandwidth 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05
Observations 27520 19311 9811 6156
bw=0.5 bw=0.25 bw=0.1 bw=0.05
C. Third measure
PSOE mayor -0.020 0.058 0.000 0.038
(0.063) (0.105) (0.158) (0.189)
Bandwidth 0.50 0.25 0.10 0.05
Observations 27520 19311 9811 6156
Notes: Census-area level regressions. S.e clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. Coefficients are the
estimated jump in different measures of spending bias towards left-wing areas at the threshold where a left-wing
government wins an election (using a fuzzy RDD design, details in the main text). Results are from a local linear
regression with slope allowed to differ at either side of the threshold. From left to right, we restrict the sample to
elections in which the absolute value of the vote margin was less than 50, 25, 10 and 5% respectively.
absolute value when using this alternative buffer. These estimates show that our main results
are robust to different assumptions about who benefited from Plan E projects and who did not.
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Table B.8
The effect of turnout on the propensity to invest - Projects with Localized Benefits
Broad Narrow Very narrow
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Turnout (2007) -0.120*** -0.136*** -0.094**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.31 0.25 0.25
Observations 27756 25159 24274
N. Projects N. Projects N. Projects
Turnout (2007) -0.608*** -0.302*** -0.238***
(0.20) (0.10) (0.09)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.36 0.32 0.32
Observations 27756 25159 24274
Cost share Cost share Cost share
Turnout (2007) -0.043*** -0.060*** -0.047**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.39 0.29 0.28
Observations 27756 25159 24274
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal one if the census area received at least one project. Sample
restricted to different project types in each column, with projects with “broadly”, “narrowly” and “very narrowly”
localized effects in columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Observations from municipalities having no projects of a
particular type are excluded, in each case, from the estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the municipal
level. Municipal fixed effects and full set of controls included in all specifications.
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Table B.9
Projects with Localized Benefits - Ex-Post Effects on Turnout
Broad Narrow Very narrow
Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011)
Project 1/0 0.0037*** 0.0035*** 0.0032***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Turnout 2007 0.2960*** 0.3134*** 0.3149***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.89 0.88 0.88
Observations 27744 25151 24268
Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011)
N. Projects 0.0014*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Turnout 2007 0.2963*** 0.3135*** 0.3150***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.89 0.88 0.88
Observations 27744 25151 24268
Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011) Turnout (2011)
Cost share 0.0027 0.0061*** 0.0056***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Turnout 2007 0.2956*** 0.3133*** 0.3148***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.89 0.88 0.88
Observations 27744 25151 24268
Notes: The dependent variable is the 2011 turnout (at the census area level) in all specifications. Sample restricted
to different project types in each column, with projects with “broadly”, “narrowly” and “very narrowly” localized
effects in columns 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Observations from municipalities having no projects of a particular type
are excluded, in each case, from the estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Municipal
fixed effects and full set of controls included in all specifications.
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Table B.10
Robustness checks - big cities
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Vote sh. 2011 Turnout 2011
Vote sh. 2007 -0.0064 0.7256***
(0.060) (0.017)
Turnout 2007 -0.1094* 0.3045***
(0.064) (0.014)
Project 1/0 -0.0001 0.0045***
(0.001) (0.001)
FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.31 0.31 0.93 0.91
Observations 16602 16602 16593 16593
Notes: Sample restricted to province capitals. Municipality fixed effects and controls are included in all columns.
S.e. are clustered at the municipal level.
Table B.11
Robustness checks - PP and PSOE mayors
Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Vote sh. 2011 Turnout 2011
Vote sh. 2007 -0.0236 0.7623***
(0.039) (0.015)
Turnout 2007 -0.1514*** 0.2974***
(0.050) (0.024)
Project 1/0 -0.0001 0.0041***
(0.001) (0.001)
FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.33 0.33 0.94 0.89
Observations 24848 24848 24837 24837
Notes: Sample restricted to municipalities ruled by either PP or PSOE. Municipality fixed effects and controls are
included in all columns. S.e. are clustered at the municipal level.
Table B.12
Robustness checks - Buffers (25 meters)
Proj.1/0 (25m) Proj.1/0 (25m) Vote sh. 2011 Turnout 2011
Vote sh. 2007 -0.0088 0.7407***
(0.043) (0.018)
Turnout 2007 -0.1253** 0.2944***
(0.050) (0.020)
Proj.1/0 (25m) 0.0005 0.0032***
(0.001) (0.001)
FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.30 0.31 0.94 0.89
Observations 27892 27892 27880 27880
Notes: In this table we use the presence of a project within 25 meters (rather than the point location of the project)
to construct the project dummy. Municipal fixed effects and controls are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered
at the municipal level.
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Table B.13
Robustness checks - Buffers (50 meters)
Proj.1/0 (50m) Proj.1/0 (50m) Vote sh. 2011 Turnout 2011
Vote sh. 2007 0.0059 0.7407***
(0.050) (0.018)
Turnout 2007 -0.1069** 0.2944***
(0.047) (0.020)
Proj.1/0 (50m) 0.0001 0.0028***
(0.001) (0.001)
FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R2 0.29 0.29 0.94 0.89
Observations 27897 27897 27885 27885
Notes: In this table we use the presence of a project within 50 meters (rather than the point location of the project)
to construct the project dummy. Municipal fixed effects and controls are included in all columns. S.e. are clustered
at the municipal level.
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Appendix B.6. Additional figures
Figure B.7
Examples of Plan E Investments
Restoration and accessibility improvement in nearby streets in the urban spaces around Eresma, Toro and Tormes
streets in the municipality of Leganés, south of Madrid. The total cost of this project was € 3,200,000, financed by
Plan E through FEIL.
Environmental adaptation and improvement in the low areas of Barrio del Villablanca, in the municipality of
Almería, in Southern Spain. The total cost of this project was € 4,864,380 financed by Plan E through FEESL.
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